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An optimalcontrolmodelis used to determinethe socially optimalspatialand temporal
allocationof groundwaterand surfacewateramongagriculturalandurbanuses. The
controlmodelis describedbrieflyandits advantagesover otherdynamicmodelsare
enumerated.Optimalrates of groundwaterpumpageover the planninghorizonwere
highlysensitive to increasingenergycosts. Groundwaterbasins are shown to react
differentlyto alternativeeconomic and hydrologicalparameters.In a dynamicsetting, a
policy of pumptaxes was shownempiricallyto be superiorto pro-rataquotasand
uncontrolledpumpage.
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The severe drought in the western United
States in 1976-78 broughtthe problems of allocating extremely limited water resources to
the attention of agriculturalistsand urbanites
alike. Greatly reduced surface water supplies
exacerbated the already critical pressure on
remaining groundwater stocks in the same
areas.
The chronic overdraft of many western
states groundwater basins can be attributed
directlyto their common pool nature.The lack
of explicit property rights to groundwater
stocks results in individual users of the resource evaluating only their own private
pumpingcosts in their decision frameworkand
implicitly assigning a zero opportunitycost to
the stock portion of the resource. Thus, the
private decision does not take into account
any user cost and results in a divergencein the
private and the social optimal rate of pumping.1
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1 Scott defines user cost of a naturalresource as "the
present
value of futureprofitforegoneby a decision to producea unit of
outputtoday." Althoughthis definitionis used in the context of a
firm,it also appliesto the waterresourceprobprofit-maximizing
lem and refers to the existence value of the stock.

The objective of this paper is to describe
brieflyan optimal control model which can be
used to determinethe socially optimal spatial
and temporal allocation of groundwater and
surface water among agriculturaland urban
uses. The control model is then applied to a
representativeregion of Californiaunder several sets of energy costs. Two policies, prorata allocation and taxation, are evaluated
empirically as alternatives for accounting for
externalitiesdue to the commonpool problem.
The ConceptualFramework
Several authorshave investigatedthe conjunctive use of groundwater and surface water
using various techniques. Buras developed a
dynamic programmingalgorithmto solve the
problem of conjunctive use of reservoirs and
aquifers. His operatingpolicy, however, considered the physical system as a single unit
and thus ignoreddifferences in hydrologythat
occur in a complex groundwatersystem. Burt
(1964, 1966, 1967a, b) utilized a mathematical
programmingapproachto develop a demand
function for irrigationwater used in a dynamic
programmingformulationof the aquifer managementproblem. Bredehoeftand Young used
a simulationmodel to estimate the solution of
problems involving the development of a
stream-aquifersystem in an economic model
of irrigation. Bear and Levin studied optimal
utilization of an aquifer as one element of a

water resource system. They provideda theoretical frameworkin which a demandfunction
for water is an integral part of an aquifer
model. Gisser and Mercado (1972, 1973) also
integratethe demandfunction for water into a
hydrologic model.
The model proposed in this paper is a linear
quadraticcontrol model (LQCM) and is composed of two basic parts, (a) an economic
component and (b) a hydrologic component.
The economic component contains a derived
demand model, a stock opportunity cost
model, and an urban demand model. The derived demandsare obtainedfrom a linear programmingmodel. The use of linear programmingto develop demandfunctions for agricultural water is rationalized in Moore and
Hedges and Gisser. The stock opportunity
cost model is a set of marginalpumpingcost
functions which are estimated so that the
stock value of the resource can be derived.
Finally, urban demand functions were estimated by an indirect method so that the
LQCM can allocate water efficiently between
the two sectors.
The hydrologic component of the LQCM is
comprised of a set of equations of motion for
the surface water reservoirs and groundwater
basins. The former are estimated from data
obtained from a surface water hydrology
model, while the latter are a set of simultaneous equations estimated from data obtained
from a finite element groundwater model.
These equations indicate the changes that will
occur in groundwater depths, given various
pumpingand recharge rates and also account
for subsurface flow between basins.
The LQCM maximizes the value of economic components subject to the constraints
implied by the hydrologic component. This
particular model extends previous work in
several ways. First, there is a direct interaction in the LQCMbetween a complex multibasin aquifer-surfacewater system and the demandsfor water. Second, the LQCMis solved
by an algorithm based on Pontryagin et al.
maximumprinciple,which provides an advantage over other work using dynamic pro-

components of the water resource simultaneously, thereby allowing the calculation of
the socially optimal spatial and temporalallocation.
Application of the Conceptual Framework

The geographical setting, Yolo County, located in the southwest corner of the Sacramento Valley, was selected for several reasons. It provides an example of a region in
which conjunctive use of groundwater and
surfacewaterhas evolved withoutany particular centralized planning (California Department of Water Resources). Several water
agencies have areas of jurisdiction within the
county and most if not all of each agency's
planningis independentof the others with decisions being made to maximizeprivate rather
than overall social value of the water.
The county has a highly variable supply of
surface water from Clear Lake, Indian Valley
Reservoir, and the Sacramento River-Colusa
Drain complex, used almost exclusively for
irrigation.Groundwatersuppliesa more costly
but more dependable source of water to both
agriculturaland urbanusers. The aquifer was
partitioned into six basins for modeling purposes and follows the work done by hydrologistsScott and Scalmanini.The partitioning permittedthe model to allocate water spatially and took account of unequal pumping
lifts throughoutthe aquifer.There was also the
problemof unequalspecific yields throughout
the aquifer,and the division of the aquiferinto
several basins permittedspecificationof storage capacities reflectingyields. The division of
the aquifer required that the subsurface inflows and outflows between the six basins be
accounted for in the model. Burt (1974) developed an approximatelyoptimal decision rule
where the subsurfaceflow between two basins
in the same aquifer is explicitly contained in
the model. For the model reported here, the
subsurfaceflow is calculatedby the groundwater model. Thus, the coefficients of the
groundwater stock variables contain the ef-

gramming, which limits the number of state fects of the subsurface flow term.
The LQCM used for determining allocations
and control variables. Finally, the use of the
of
water resources in Yolo County can be repof
the
user
calculation
direct
allows
LQCM
cost of groundwater. Both Kelso and Renshaw resented as follows:
discuss the importance of including stock val- (1) Max W =
RR'ut - ?ut'Rut
ues in determining optimal water allocation.
- KK'yt + yt'Kyt,
By using the LQCM, it is possible to maximize
the value of both the stock and current value subject to

(2)
(3)
(4)

Yt = Ayt-1 - But_- + Cxt-1 + d,
Yt - y*t < 0,
<
ut - u*t 0, and

(5)
Yt 0
Ut 0.O
The welfare function [equation
(1)] is an
explicit economic measure of welfare. It is
composed of two parts. Producer and consumer surplusmeasuresthe economic value of
the flow component of the water resource
base. The consumer surplusis associated with
the urban sector demand functions, while the
producer surplus represents economic rent
available to the agriculturalsector.2 The second part is a social surplus for the stock portion of the water resource base. It measures
the returns to the stock that could be gained
from monopoly control. The social surplusincreases as stocks increase and pumpingcosts
decrease, ceteris paribus; and, alternatively,
the social surplusdecreases as stocks diminish
and pumping costs increase. Note that these
components are inversely related. The consumer and producer surplus components relate to flows and increase at a diminishingrate
with increasingwater use; however, as water
use increases stocks diminish and the rents
associated with this component decrease at an

increasing rate. Thus, the model maximizes
the value of the water resource base by equating the net marginalvalue of the flow to the
opportunitycost or marginalvalue of the stock
in that period.3
The welfare function is subject to two sets
of constraints. The first set [equation (2)] is
the equations of motion or first-orderdifference equations describing the physical system. This is a reduced-formsystem, which in
this study is a linear approximationto a complex physical system. A, B, and C are specified
as time invariantmatricesand d is a vector of
constants. The second set of constraints[equations (3), (4), and (5)] respresents the physical, institutional,and nonnegativityconditions
on the stocks and flows of water. These constraints are not applied to every scenario
posed by the model but ratheract as individual
scenario conditions so that resultingallocation
patterns and effects on social welfare can be
observed.
The Results

One reason for using an optimalcontrol model
was that it allowed direct calculation and interpretationof the user costs associated with
temporalallocations. Table 1 presents the net

3 The net marginalvalue is defined as the marginalvalue of
2 This measure has been used by Samuelson and later waternet of watercost. A moredetaileddescriptionof the empiriTakayamaand Judgeto measuresocial welfare.Mishandiscusses cal modelandthe analyticalnecessaryconditionsfor achievingan
the assumptionsof this approachto social welfare measurement. optimalsolution is containedin Noel.

Table 1. Stock User Costs, Net Marginal Values, and Transformed User Costs (1977-2005,
$0.045/kwh.)
Value (dollars/acre-foot)
Groundwater Basin

Value Measure

Cache Creek

stock user costs
net marginal values
transformed user costs

Upper Cache-Putah

stock user costs
net marginal values
transformed user costs
stock user costs
net marginal values
transformed user costs
stock user costs
net marginal values
transformed user costs
stock user costs
net marginal values
transformed user costs
stock user costs
net marginal values
transformed user costs

Plainfield Ridge

Lower Cache-Putah

Colusa

East Yolo

1977

1980

1985

1990

1995

28.79
5.68
6.01

23.15
5.24
4.84

16.19
3.20
3.38

11.33
2.24
2.37

7.79
1.52
1.62

4.93
0.93
1.03

1.94
0.26
0.40

30.00
8.19
8.73

24.47
7.64
7.12

17.32
4.71
5.04

12.06
3.01
3.51

8.05
2.14
2.34

4.76
1.21
1.38

1.67
0.31
0.47

1,214.10
61.13
240.39

653.10
61.13
129.32

83.57
13.06
16.55

118.63
7.81
8.42

21.53
3.03
4.26
30.07
1.94
2.13

0.87
-0.0
0.17

149.58
9.83
10.62

-0.00
=0.00
=0.00
4.53
0.18
0.32

27.94
7.10
7.66

23.18
5.88
6.35
10.06
2.00
2.19

8.50
1.95
2.33
3.60
0.72
0.78

5.65
1.37
1.55

12.23
2.44
2.66

241.20
61.13
47.77
79.25
5.17
5.63
16.79
4.25
4.60
7.22
1.41
1.57

51.08
3.30
3.63
12.04
3.04
3.30
5.14
1.02
1.12

2000

15.76
0.94
1.12

2.35
0.44
0.51

2005

2.49
0.43
0.68
0.99
0.12
0.22

marginalvalues, stock user costs, and transformed user costs associated with the
groundwaterallocations listed in table 2. Surface water stock values are not included in
table 1 because the surface water distribution
system constraintlimits the amountof surface
water which can be used in any period to less
than would have been allocated in the unconstrained solution. This restriction increased
the net marginalvalue of the surface water in
any time period to a level greater than the
existing reservoiruser cost in that time period.
The stock user cost for all basins except
PlainfieldRidge can be interpretedas the present value of the loss in social surplus if one
more acre-foot were allocated for use in the
specific time period. For example, if one more
acre-foot of water were used from the Lower
Cache-Putahbasinthan is socially optimal,the
value of the stock would diminishby $149.58.
The user cost figuresgiven for PlainfieldRidge
are not an accurate estimate of the true user
cost because the lower bound constraint on
the depth of the water table was reached. This
constraint assumes that the volume of stored
water associated with a depth greaterthan 420
feet is zero. Even though somewhat arbitrary,
Table 2.
Kwh.)

the lack of data on groundwaterstorage beneath 420 feet made the constraintnecessary.
The transformeduser costs are the present
value of the stock in terms of currentuse. The
transformationwas made by the model to allocate water optimally between time periods.
Note that the transformeduser costs and net
marginal values are approximately equal in
each time period for each basin except
PlainfieldRidge. Differencesare due to rounding errorsassociated with use of the algorithm.
It should be noted that these transformeduser
costs are a measure of the external costs that
are imposed on other pumpers under the
common property situation where private decision makingon the partof individualusers of
the groundwaterbasins is based solely on private ratherthan the social cost of pumpinga
unit of water. Except for PlainfieldRidge, the
extreme values of transformed user cost is
$10.62 for Lower Cache-Putahand $2.66 for
East Yolo. This indicates that differentbasins
even in the same aquifer can exhibit different
external costs. The magnitudeof these costs
can serve as at least one measure of whether
or not governmentalintervention into the allocative process is warranted.The differences

Optimal Temporal Groundwater and Surface Water Allocations (1977-2005, $0.045/
(Acre-Feet)

Groundwater Basin

Water Supply

1977

1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

2005

Cache Creek

surface
agriculture
groundwater
surface
agriculture
groundwater
urban
groundwater
surface
agriculture
groundwater
surface
agriculture
groundwater
urban
groundwater
surface
agriculture
groundwater
surface
agriculture
groundwater
urban
groundwater

15,646

15,646

15,646

15,646

15,646

15,646

15,646

Upper Cache-Putah

Plainfield Ridge

Lower Cache-Putah

Colusa

East Yolo

47,525

47,586

47,663

47,747

47,926

48,504

91,955

91,955

91,955

91,955

91,955

91,955

50,567
91,955

33,859

33,872

33,967

34,251

34,982

36,825

41,361

1,344

2,073

2,394

2,394

3,395

3,395

2,234
3,395

3,395

3,395

2,394
3,395

2,394
3,395

0

0

0

36,605

36,605

36,605

7,492
36,605

12,879
36,605

15,601
36,605

36,605

139,670

141,690

146,050

152,320

161,620

175,700

197,340

17,763
179,130

21,870

24,199
179,130

26,503

27,467

29,149

179,130

179,130

179,130

179,130

29,149
179,130

93,909
130,870

93,511
130,870

93,127
130,870

93,023
130,870

93,459
130,870

96,191
130,870

110,580
130,870

59,571

59,548

59,527

59,536

59,628

60,054

61,904

8,289

10,427

11,051

11,629

12,926

13,528

13,528

0

in net marginalvalues and also in user costs in
the six basins indicate potentials for economic
intra and interbasintransfers of groundwater.
Table 2 contains the optimal spatial and
temporal allocation of groundwaterand surface water suggested by the model under a
4.5g electrical power cost scenario. Several
observations can be made about these results.
The amount of groundwaterused for agriculturalproductiongenerallyincreases over time.
Several economic factors determine the temporalallocationof water in the model. Factors
which limit the quantityallocated to a specific
period are (a) increased pumpingcosts for the
remainder of the planning horizon for those
basins having declining water tables and (b)
lower marginalvalues from additional quantities of water used in that time period. The
factors tending to increase the quantity used
per period are (a) time preferencereflectedby
the discount rate and (b) high net marginal
values on low rates of water usage. The wide
range of agriculturalgroundwater pumpages
(0.0 to 141,690 acre-feet in 1980) illustrates
quite dramatically the variability in optimal
groundwater allocations that can exist in a
single aquifer when both the economic and
physical parametersin each basin are considered in the decision-makingprocess.
Table 2 also contains urbangroundwaterallocations which are based on "need" projections. The projections are based on urban
water requirementstudies done by several engineering consulting firms, and by using an
urban water projection model developed by
Savage and Helweg for estimatingthe impact
of population and areal growth patterns for
water use rates for the City of Davis. The
projectionswere used as constraintson urban
allocations because early control model runs,
based on the hypotheticalurbandemandfunc-

tions estimated for this study, allocated certain amounts to the urban areas in excess of
existing or projected distribution system
capacity.
The amount of groundwater needed by
urban users moves from 6.8% of the total
amount of groundwaterused in all basins in
1977to 8.6% of the total by 2,005. This represents a small proportionof the total amountof
groundwater used in any period. Thus, the
impacts on groundwater stocks by urban
usage is ratherinsignificantfor any basin as a
whole. This suggests that concern that urban
growthwill affect adversely agriculturalpumpage and pumpingcost is largely unfounded.
The surfacewater allocationsshown in table
2 can be explained by the surface water cost
used in this model: namely, those that existed
in 1977 were selected due to the difficulty in
predicting the future price-setting actions of
the various agencies allocating surface water.
Because surface water costs are substantially
less than groundwaterpumpingcosts, surface
water allocations depend on the relative net
marginalvalues of this water between the various basins and on the capacity of the distribution system. Surfacewater allocationsare limited in every power cost scenario by constraintsassociated with either reservoir water
distributioncapacity or the amount of surface
water that can be obtained from the Sacramento River-Colusa Drain complex. The
surface water allocations listed in table 2 are
thus constrained allocations.
Table 3 contains the groundwater depths
and surface water stocks associated with the
optimal allocations contained in table 2. Note
that in three of the six basins the water table
decreases over time, while in the remaining
three it increases. This set of figuresindicates
quite strikingly that treating the whole

Table 3. GroundwaterDepths and Surface Water Stocks (1977-2005, $0.045/Kwh.)
Depth to Groundwater (feet)
Groundwater Basin
Cache Creek
Upper Cache-Putah
Plainfield Ridge
Lower Cache-Putah
Colusa
East Yolo

Clear Lake
Indian Valley

1977
64
41
105
53
55
20

315,000
138,789

1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

2005

77
69
74
38
40
39
145
190
119
61
65
56
42
50
45
15
13
18
Effective Storage (acre-feet)

80
38
262
71
41
12

81
39
385
76
40
11

82
39
>420
81
41
11

315,000
139,893

315,000
139,893

315,000
139,893

315,000
139,893

315,000
139,574

315,000
139,857

groundwater basin in Yolo County as an
aggregateunit would miss the sizeable variation in optimal utilization of the groundwater
in the various basins composing the aquifer.
These data show that the choice of a planning
unit for determiningoptimalwater allocations
is very important. If the unit chosen is too
large, and a single utilization rate were used
throughout, groundwatermighe be seriously
under- or over-utilized. Even more subdivision of the aquiferstudiedmighthave revealed
even more variation in optimal utilization
rates, but furtheranalysis was infeasible.
Effects of rising energy costs. Energy costs
can have an importantinfluence on whether
the model indicates a groundwaterbasin with
an increasing or decreasing water table. For
example, Upper Cache-Putahbasin would be
mined under a 2.6g energy cost assumption
but would have a rising water table initially
under the 8g energy cost assumption (fig.
1). The remaining basins move in the same
direction as indicated in table 4 at alternative
energy cost assumptions. In those basins
where groundwater use exceeds recharge
under a 4.5g energy cost, the effect of higher
energy costs is to slow down the rate of mining.
Table 4 illustrates the impact increasing
energy costs have on temporal water allocation, using the Cache Creek basin as an example. Surface water allocations depend upon
the net marginal value of water in a single
basin relative to the net marginal values in
other competingbasins. For Cache Creek, the
allocations are reasonablyconstant over time.
Groundwaterpumpageat any time period decreases as expected as energy costs increase,
because the net marginal value of water is
lower and the stock value is higher.
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Figure 1. Impact of constant energy cost on
Upper Cache-Putah Basin groundwater depth
($0.026/kwh. and $0.080/kwh., 1975-2015)
Policies to Reduce Misallocation
of Groundwater

In this section two policies are analyzed empirically that could be utilized to achieve a
more socially preferredallocation of groundwater. The focus here is on groundwaterbecause of the lack of any definitive empirical
studies which evaluate the impact of various
policies on the social value of groundwater.
This is not meant to infer that surface water
allocation is unimportant.Quite to the contrary, surface water sources supply almost
one-half the county's agriculturalwater demands.
The control model provided the socially
efficient allocations of the surface water resource. If contractual arrangements were
made on a "market value" rather than a
"first come-first serve" arrangement, then

Table 4. Increasing Energy Cost Impacts on Temporal Surface and Groundwater Allocations,
1975-2015--Cache Creek Basin (acre-feet)
Energy
Cost
($/Kwh.)
0.026
0.045
0.065
0.080

Water
Supply
surface water
groundwater
surface water
groundwater
surface water
groundwater
surface water
groundwater

1975

1977

1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

2005

14,465
51,714

14,465
51,748
15,645
47,525

14,465
51,790

14,465
51,850

14,465
51,932

14,465
52,148

14,465
54,073

15,645
47,586
17,122
42,533

15,645
47,663
17,122
43,012
15,793
38,949

15,645
47,747
17,122
43,082
15,793
38,990

15,645
47,926
17,122
43,204
15,793
39,040

14,465
52,887
15,645
48,504
17,122
43,566
15,793
39,158

15,645
50,567
17,122
44,832
15,793
39,550

2010

2015

17,122
47,980
15,793
40,952

15,793
44,450

surface water would move toward a more socially efficient allocation. For example, if agriculturalproducers were allowed to bid for
availablewater supplies, assured full property
rightsand perfect competition, they would bid
the price up to the level of the marginalvalue
of water utilized in production. Because the
control model is based on exactly this type of
allocation procedure, it is expected that surface allocationresultingfrom the "water market" arrangementwould approximatethe socially optimum allocation indicated by the
control model.
The pro-rata groundwaterpolicy. The prorata method is one that attacks the common
pool problem by adjudicatingannual groundwater quotas to overlying landowners. The
quota most often recommendedis established
by restrictingpumpage to the long-run mean
rechargerate. This suggests that no miningof
the resource should be permittedon the average.
Table 5 provides a comparison of the total
value of the groundwaterresource for the entire Yolo County aquifer under socially optimum conditions (no restrictionson temporal
allocations of the resource in any basin) as
opposed to a quota system, where the quota is
limited to the mean recharge rate. This comparison is made under two energy cost
scenarios and the results under both energy
cost runs indicate that using a quota diminishes the potentialsocial benefits to be derived from the resource. The 4.5g energy cost
scenario shows a much wider divergencefrom
the optimal social value, however, than does
the 6.5o energy cost scenario. The percentage
loss of social value under the 4.50 energy
scenario ranges from 11% to 6% over the
planning horizon, while for the 6.5e energy
scenario the range is only 4.4% to 1.1%. As

energy costs increase and the optimal amount
of water to be used in any single period declines, the quota system comes closer to approximatingthe social value of the resourceon
a basin-wide basis.
Fromthe above it is obvious that quotas will
be least inefficientwhere the amountof water
mining in the optimal allocation is small in
relation to recharge. However, quotas always
will be suboptimalif any economic miningof
the resource is optimal, and their inefficiency
will increase as transaction costs are taken
into consideration. These costs would be in
the form of administratingand policing the
quota policy. The quota values listed in table 5
include none of these costs, and thus must be
viewed as upper bounds and the differences
are biased downwards.It shouldbe noted here
that this situationis not uniquefor quota policies. Any policy which controls the use of a
common propertyresource in a more socially
preferred manner probably would require a
new institutional structure and therefore
would require new transaction costs.
Laissez-faire groundwater policy. The in-

clusion of transactioncosts in the calculus of
considering policy changes creates the possibility that the status quo may offer the "best"
that can be done in terms of maximizingthe
social value of the water resource. Table 6
compares the value of the groundwater of
Yolo County under a purely private decision-making situation where each pumper
decides independently how much water to
take from the aquiferand the socially efficient
situation where the negative externalities associated with private actions are taken into
consideration.The user cost or stock value is
assigned a zero value to represent the private
allocation situation.
There is a large difference between the so-

Table 5. Yearly and Total Present Value of the Water Resource under Socially Efficient and
Quota Allocations (1977-2010, $0.045/Kwh. and $0.065/Kwh.)
Energy
Cost
($/Kwh.)
0.045

0.065

Value
Measure
Social
Quota
Difference
Social
Quota
Difference

1977

1980

1985

1990

16,860
15,224
1,636
19,185
18,292
893

12,820
11,710
1,110
13,781
13,696
412

2000

2005

2010

Totala

2,830
2,800
30

294,240
268,750
25,490
259,160
252,410
6,750

($ thousand)-

- -------------------------22,122
19,619
2,493

1995

9,230
8,530
700

6,150
5,730
420

4,710
4,410
300

3,350
3,150
200

9,840
9,640
200

7,160
7,040
120

5,160
5,090
70

3,720
3,670
50

a Represents total value of the water resource over the entire planning horizon.

Table 6. Yearly and Total Present Value of the Water Resource under Socially Efficient and
Private Decision Allocations (1977-2005, $0.045/Kwh.)
Value
Measure
Social
Private
Difference

1977

1980

1985

22,112
18,068
4,044

16,860
14,694
2,166

12,820
10,485
2,335

1995

2000

2005

Totala

($ thousand)
6,150
9,230
7,174
5,103
1,047
2,056

4,410
3,612
798

3,120
2,565
555

294,240
241,322
52,918

1990

a Representstotal value of the water resourceover the entire planninghorizon.

cial optimumand the privateoptimumvalue of levy a tax on pumping. This is a widely prothe water resource, much larger than the dif- posed solution to correct a divergence beference between the social optimum and the tween privateand social costs (Pigou). In this
quota solution described above. These differ- case the marginalprivate cost is simply the
ences, however, are not directly comparable marginalcost of pumpingto individualusers.
because they measure different things. The The marginalsocial cost includes as well the
difference between the quota and the social- loss of productivity to individual users bely optimum value represents the returns cause of competitive pumping.The dominant
foregone if the amount of groundwaterusage problem with Pigovian solutions is the selecis limited to a long-runmean rechargequota. tion of the correct tax (Baumol). Milliman
The unrestrictedpumpingvalue is a measure demonstrates that if the marginalvalue of a
of the externalcost imposed on all water users unit of water pumpedis equated to the margiby the failure of individual pumpers to take nal social cost of pumping the water that a
into account the total social costs of individual social optimum has been reached.
The necessary condition for the empirical
pumping.The total differencebetween the social optimum and the private solution is modelto allocate water optimallyrequiresthat
$52,918,000 over the thirty-year-planning the net marginalvalue of a unit of water used
horizon. In comparingthe unrestricted solu- be equated to the transformeduser cost. Betion to the quota policy solution, it must be cause the marginalprivate pumpingcosts alconcluded that neither policy is efficient. ready have been subtractedfrom the marginal
However, the quota policy appears better to values, the transformed user cost actually
approximatethe social optimumthan does the measures the difference between the marginal
unrestrictedpumpingpolicy. Thus, a policy to social and marginalprivate cost of pumpinga
control groundwater use appears to be jus- unit of water. As such, it represents the optitified if the transactioncosts are less than the mal marginaltax rate that is requiredto force
costs of the externalities.Thus, even thoughit private and social costs to converge.
Table 7 contains the optimal tax under a
has been shown that the long-run recharge
quota is not a "good" policy for reachingthe 4.5o energy cost scenario. The results listed in
true social value of the water resource, it can the table indicatethat the optimaltax structure
be used to control allocations so that the nega- is not a fixed levy over the entire planning
tive externalitiesare taken into consideration. horizon, but is rather a declining set of tax
It appears, therefore, that a good case can rates. The table results raise other issues.
be made for limiting the water pumped from First, all tax rates are positive. At first glance
the aquifer, unless there are opportunitiesfor this may appear somewhat surprising given
economically efficient transfers among basins that three of the six basins indicate rising
on the surface througha markettransferpro- water tables after the 4.50 energy cost has
cess. If so, continued overdraftingwould be been reached. Even with rising water tables,
justified only if the value of the transferred however, if an individual pumper did not
water at the marginwere higherthan the sum extract a unit of water, the water table would
of the user costs, pumpingcosts, and transfer rise somewhat higherthan if the unit of water
were extracted. This extractionthus increases
costs.
the
An
alternative
tax
pumping costs of the other individuals
policy
policy.
Pumping
for managinga groundwaterbasin that suffers using the aquifer.
In addition,the tax rates show a wide range
from the problemof commonalityof use is to

Table 7. Optimal Tax Rate Schedule for the Yolo County GroundwaterBasins (1977-2000,
$0.045/Kwh.)
GroundwaterBasin
Cache Creek
Upper Cache-Putah
PlainfieldRidge
Lower Cache-Putah
Colusa
East Yolo

1977

1980

-------------------------------6.01
4.84
7.12
8.73
129.32
240.39
8.42
10.62
7.66
6.35
2.19
2.66

of values, depending on several factors: (a)
the physical parametersof the individualbasins; (b) the costs associated with pumpinga
unit of groundwater; and (c) the economic
demands for currentuse (both for agriculture
and urban use).
Finally, the tax rate declines over time
under constant energy costs, a result to be
expected since over time the stock values
(user costs) decline. This reduces the disparity
between the restricted pumpingsituation and
the socially optimalallocation, and the tax rate
correspondinglydeclines.
From an analyticalviewpoint the two methods of dealing with commonalityof water use
offer very differentlines of attack. Quota setting in effect imposes a tighter constraint on
the resource than does taxation. Quota setting
transfersthe decision makingfrom the private
user to a central agency. Taxation allows
greater flexibility because the decision on
pumpageis left to the individualuser. The tax
simply becomes another component of the
pumper's cost function and is taken into consideration when deciding how much water
should be used in any time period. Baumol
demonstratesthat where an externality (technical) exists that taxes upon the generatorof
the externality are all that is requiredto produce an efficient allocation. Baumol argues
that even if the level of taxation needs to be
adjusted in a tatonnementprocess to achieve
the desired result, it is still the best way to
correct the divergencebetween social and private cost.
ConcludingRemarks
This paper has proposed a control model
frameworkfor determiningthe optimal spatial
and temporalallocation of water in a complex
hydrologic and economic setting. The advantage of this frameworkover past work done in

1985

1990

1995

Tax ($/acre-feet)------------------------2.37
3.38
1.62
5.04
3.51
2.34
47.77
16.55
4.26
3.63
2.13
5.62
2.33
4.60
3.30
1.12
1.57
0.78

2000
1.03
1.38
0.17
1.12
1.55
0.51

the area of water resource allocation is the
ability of the model to handlea large degree of
disaggregationand to provide valuable economic and hydrologic informationabout the
physical system with respect to its common
pool nature.Thus, this paperdemonstratesthe
usefulness of a frameworkthat can take the
interactionof several groundwaterbasins into
considerationas the socially optimum allocaTwo broad policy implitions are determined&
cations can be drawn from the results.
First, the areal size of a water resourceplanning unit must be chosen with care. The
results presented in this paper illustratequite
dramaticallythat the six basins makingup the
Yolo County aquiferreact differentlyto alternative economic and hydrologic parameters.
In terms of policy, this means that designation
of groundwaterplanningunits should be based
on economic and hydrologic parametersand
not on political or geographical boundaries.
The degree of hydrologicinterdependencebetween differentbasins in the same aquifer, or
between aquifers, is the key factor in determining any planning unit. These interdependencies are directly related to the common
pool problem associated with groundwater
use. If the interdependencies are not accounted for in the allocation decision, there
will be a large reductionin the social value of
the groundwaterresource.
The second policy implicationrelates to the
economic impacts associated with policy alternatives for moving currentgroundwaterallocations to a more socially preferredset. Although taxation and pro-rataallocations have
been suggested a numberof times in the literature as institutionalinstrumentsto achieve a
more socially optimal allocation of resources,
the currentframeworkhas shown the change
in social value of the resource that can be
expected upon their implementation.The results indicate that both instruments will increase the social value of the groundwaterre-

source but that if any miningof the resource is
Waterin the Pecos RiverBasin." WaterResour.Res.
that
6(1970):1025-32.
taxation
for
the
contemplated,
provides
greatest social value of the groundwaterbeing Gisser, M., and A. Mercado. "Economic Aspects of
GroundwaterResources and ReplacementFlows in
achieved.
Semi-Arid and AgriculturalAreas." Amer. J. Agr.
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